The Supreme Court hears oral arguments Wednesday on the constitutionality of .Arizona's 2010 im1nigration enforcement lav>'. If upheld, SB 1070 Vl'ould require local police in 1nost circumstances to deterinine the immigration status of anyone they stop based only on a reasonable suspicion that the person is unla\vfully in this country. It ¥:ould also compel residents to carry their immigration papers at all times and create state itnmigration critnes distinct fro1n what is covered by federal la\\', Afe,v other states, such as Alaban1a and Georgia, and some cities have passed similar la,vs, and 1nany n1ore 1nay consider such Jaw"S if the Supreme Court finds Arizona's law to be constitutional.
The priinaiy legal debate in U.S. vs. Arizona \viii focus on the issue of whether a state government can engage in immigration enforcement \vithout the explicit consent of the federal government. The state of Arizona \\ill argue that its measure simply complen1ents federal enforcement, \\'hile the federal gove111ment 'vill argue that Arizona's la'v undennines national authority and that immigration enforcement is an exclusively federal responsibility.
Missing from this important legal debate, ho\\'ever, is the larger question of \\ 1 hy states and localities are getting involved in in1migration enforcement in the first place. The conventional v.isdo1n on these policies is that federal inaction, combined \vith den1ographic pressures fro1n itnmigration, have left these states and cities little choice but to act. According to this logic, ne\v immigrants, especially illegal hn1nigrants, are causing cultural and economic upheavals in places unaccustomed to such transformations. Consequently, la\\'S like Arizona's SB 1070 and Alabama's HB 56 are seen as natural and ine,itable responses.
These reasons, hO\\'ever, do not stand up to e1nphical investigation. In our ne\v systematic study of these state and local immigration lav.
•s, the data sho\v that comn1only assumed factors -e.g., the gro\vth of immigrant populations, immigrant-caused economic stress, prevalence of Spanish speakers and overcrov.·ded housing -1nake no significant difference in the proposal or passage of these restrictive in1n1igration laws.
By contrast, political partisanship consistently predicts \Vhen and \vhere states and localities 'vill introduce restrictive in1migration la\vs, with Republican-heavy areas especial1y likely to do so. For instance, restrictive ordinances are 93% more likely to pass in Republican counties than in Democratic ones. At the state level, there is a 47% difference bet\\'een Republican-heavy states and De1nocrat-heavy states.
Restrictionist and anti-illegal immigrant activist groups, such as Numbers USA, the Federation for An1erican I1nmigration Reform and rising stars in the Republican Party, such as Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach, choose venues for iln1nigration enforce1nent schemes that are politically receptive to im1nigration restriction. These places -like Valley Park, Mo., and the state of Alaba1na -are not necessarily areas that have experienced the greatest increases in in1migration or immigrant-induced social and economic problems. Ho\vever, these jurisdictions are mostly Republican, \Vhere syinpathetic elected officials can fast-track restrictive bills and v.'here pri1nary voters can be counted on to push for legislative action on im1nigration.
Undoubtedly, Arizona is hea\ily Republican and has experienced great increases in inunigration. Ho,vever, other border states \vith even greater increases in their illegal im1nigrant populations, such as Ne\v Mexico and Texas, have not passed similar la\\'S. Furthermore, our larger systen1atic analysis of 25,000 municipalities and all 50 states found that partisanship-based explanations more accurately account for these laws, includingArizona 1 s.
Mean\vhile, states and localities \\ith much higher proportions and populations of legal and illegal inunigrants have either taken no action on immigration or have passed la,vs helping to integrate and acco1n1nodate their hn1nigrant populations. For exan1ple, California and Illinois allo\\' students here unla\vfully to pay in-state tuition at public universities, and have barred the state, its counties and its cities from requiring employers to participate in E-Verify, an electronic federal employment verification system. V\lhy are our findings consequential for \\'hat is happening in Arizona and else\\•here? Our political model sho\vs these la\vs should not be understood as natural and inevitable responses to the ne'v geography of itnmigration. These state and local lav.'S do not arise out of econo1nic or social necessity.
